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Taxation, Aggregates and the Household* 
We evaluate reforms to the U.S. tax system in a dynamic setup with 
heterogeneous married and single households, and with an operative 
extensive margin in labour supply. We restrict our model with observations on 
gender and skill premia, labour force participation of married females across 
skill groups, and the structure of marital sorting. We study four revenue-
neutral tax reforms: a proportional consumption tax, a proportional income tax, 
a progressive consumption tax, and a reform in which married individuals file 
taxes separately. Our findings indicate that tax reforms are accompanied by 
large and differential effects on labour supply: while hours per-worker display 
small increases, total hours and female labour force participation increase 
substantially. Married females account for more than 50% of the changes in 
hours associated to reforms, and their importance increases sharply for values 
of the intertemporal labour supply elasticity on the low side of empirical 
estimates. Tax reforms in a standard version of the model result in output 
gains that are up to 15% lower than in our benchmark economy. 
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1 Introduction
Tax reforms have been at the center of numerous debates among academic economists and
policy makers. These debates have been fueled by theoretical results establishing that taxing
capital income might not be efficient, by equity and economic efficiency trade-offs, and by
the fact that the current U.S. tax structure is complicated and distortionary. As a part of
this debate, there have been calls for tax reforms that would simplify the tax code, change
the tax base from income to consumption, and adopt a more uniform marginal tax rate
structure.1
In the existing literature, the decision maker is typically an individual who decides how
much to work, how much to save, and in some cases how much human capital investments
to make. Yet, current households are neither a collection of bread-winner husbands and
house-maker wives, nor a collection of single people. In 2000, the labor force participation
of married women between ages 25 and 54 was about 69%. Furthermore, their participation
rate increases markedly by educational attainment, and is known to respond strongly to
hourly wages. Moreover, the economic environment that these households face does not
feature wages that are gender-neutral. Hourly earnings of females relative to males, the
gender-gap, is of about 72% nowadays and has been around this value for some time.2
These observations have long been deemed important in discussions of tax reforms, but
are largely unexplored in dynamic equilibrium analyses in the macroeconomic and public-
finance literatures. We fill this void in this paper. We quantify the effects of tax reforms
taking into account the labor supply of married females as well as the current demographic
(household) structure. For these purposes, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model with
an operative extensive margin in labor supply, and a structure of individual and household
heterogeneity that is consistent with the current U.S. demographics. We use this framework
to conduct a set of hypothetical tax reform experiments, and ask: What is the importance of
the labor supply responses of married females in these experiments? What is the importance
of micro labor supply elasticities for the long-run effects on output and the labor input? How
do our results compare to those emerging from a standard (single-earner) macroeconomic
model?
1Among such reform proposals, one can list Hall and Rabushka’s (1995) flat tax, a proportional income
tax or a proportional consumption tax – see Auerbach and Hassett (2005) for a review.
2Our calculations. See Section 4 for details.
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The model economy we consider is populated with males and females who differ in their
labor market productivities, and who exhibit life-cycle behavior. Individuals start economic
life as either married or single and do not change their marital status as they age. They are
born as workers with given, immutable labor market efficiencies, and stochastically transit
into retirement and subsequently to death. Hence, in the model agents differ along their
gender, labor productivity, and marital status. Singles decide how much to work and how
much to save out of their total after-tax income. Married households decide on the labor
hours of each household member, and like singles, how much to save.
A novel feature in our analysis is the explicit modeling of the participation decision of
married females in two-person households, and its interplay with the structure of heterogene-
ity and taxation. We assume that if a married female enters the labor force, the household
faces a utility cost. This cost represents the additional difficulty originating from the need to
better coordinate multiple household activities, potential child-care costs, etc. As a result,
females in married households may choose not to work at all if this utility cost is sufficiently
high, which naturally generates labor supply movements along the extensive margin. This
is a key feature of our analysis since the structure of taxation can affect the participation
decision of married females, and available evidence suggests that it does so significantly. Our
model thus permits us to separate and quantify changes in labor supply that take place at
extensive and intensive margins.
We restrict model parameters so that our benchmark economy is consistent with relevant
aggregate and cross-sectional U.S. data. Three aspects of our parameterization are critical.
First, using data on tax returns we estimate effective tax functions for married and single
households. These functions relate taxes paid to reported incomes, and are able to capture
the complex relation between household’s incomes and taxes in a parsimonious way. Second,
we calibrate our benchmark economy to be consistent both with available estimates of in-
tertemporal elasticities of labor supply along the intensive margin, and with observations on
the labor force participation of married females. In particular, we select parameter values so
that the labor force participation of married females reacts to their own wages as it does in
the data. This aspect of our parameterization is crucial since it allows us to capture the un-
derlying elasticities of labor force participation of married females. Finally, the demographic
structure of the model is tightly mapped to U.S. observations. The marital structure of
the benchmark economy (who is single, who is married, and who is married with whom)
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reproduces exactly the structure observed in the U.S. Census. This is of importance for our
purposes; different households face different average and marginal tax rates, and reactions
of different households to a tax reform are potentially not the same.
We consider four revenue-neutral tax reforms. Three of these reforms are fundamental
in nature: a proportional consumption tax, a proportional income tax, and a progressive
consumption tax, e.g. Hall and Rabushka (1995), which consists of a single tax rate above
an exemption level. In our last reform (separate filing), we keep the progressivity and the
tax base of the current system intact, but married individuals file taxes separately. This
reform, which arises naturally in our environment, shifts the unit subject to taxation from
households to individuals. As a result, it can drastically change marginal tax rates within
married households, while effectively eliminating tax penalties (and bonuses) associated to
marital status built into the current tax code.
In line with the existing literature, we find that tax reforms can have large effects across
steady states on macroeconomic variables, such as output and capital intensity. A central
finding of our exercises is that the differential labor supply behavior of different groups is
key for an understanding of the aggregate effects of tax reforms. The related finding is that
married females account for a disproportionate fraction of the changes in hours and labor
supply. Furthermore, this fraction increases sharply for low values of the intertemporal
elasticity of labor supply.
Replacing current income taxes by a proportional consumption (income) tax increases the
aggregate output by about 11.2% (5.9%). This increase is accompanied by differential effects
on labor supply: while hours along the intensive margin increase by about 2.7% (2.4%), the
labor force participation of married females increases by about 7.3% (6.2%) and married
females increase their total hours by 10.6% (9.3%). Both reforms have similar effects on
labor supply, which suggests that the flattening of the tax schedule is what really matters
for labor supply behavior. On the other hand, their effects on capital accumulation differ
significantly, which is reflected in how much aggregate output rises.
The effects of a progressive consumption tax reform are different. The aggregate effects
are more moderate and the positive effects on labor force participation of married females are
much less pronounced. If the exemption level associated with the progressive consumption
tax reform is relatively high (higher degree of progressivity), aggregate output increase only
by about 8.0% (as opposed to 11.2% with a proportional consumption tax reform). The rise
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in the labor force participation of married females is also less pronounced than the propor-
tional consumption tax reform and is only 3.2% (instead of 7.3%). With proportional taxes,
the rise in labor force participation monotonically declines as the productivity of married
females increases. This is not the case for a progressive consumption tax. Females with low
productivity levels change their labor supply very little after a progressive consumption tax
reform. Hence, the way tax reforms affect labor supply of married females depends crucially
of the structure of the particular reform under consideration.
Finally, separate filing goes a long way in generating significant aggregate output effects.
With separate filing, aggregate output goes up by about 2.6%, which is almost half of the
increase from a proportional income tax reform. The increase in aggregate output mainly
comes from the rise in aggregate hours by married females. The labor force participation of
married females rises close to what it does under a proportional income (consumption) tax
reform: an increase of 5.9% versus 6.2% (7.3%). In contrast to other reforms, hours per male
workers are nearly constant, and the increase capital to output ratio is much more moderate.
In answering the first question posed above, “what is the importance of the labor supply
responses of married females in these experiments?”, we find that married females account
for a disproportionate fraction of the changes in hours and labor supply. Under proportional
taxes, married females account for about 58-59% of the total increase in labor hours, and
about 49-50% of the aggregate increase in labor supply (efficiency units). Under progressive
consumption taxes, married females contribute even more significantly to changes in labor
hours and labor supply; in our exercises married females can account for up to 80% and
65% of the total changes in total working hours and labor supply, respectively. Finally, with
separate filing almost all of the rise in hours and labor supply comes from married females,
as their contribution is about 92% of total change in hours and to 89% of the total change
in labor supply.
In answering the second question, “what is the importance micro labor supply elasticities
for the long-run effects on output and the labor input?”, we find that the importance of
married females rises sharply when the parameter governing the intertemporal labor supply
elasticity is lowered from our benchmark value of 0.4 to 0.2. In this case, the contribution
of married females to changes in labor hours is quite higher, ranging from 76% to 98%
across different reforms, and is driven mostly by changes in participation. While the relative
importance of female labor supply becomes much more important, the rise in the total labor
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input remains relatively constant as we alter the value of the intertemporal labor supply
elasticity. Then, a central finding is that the value of this preference parameter is of second-
order importance in understanding the effects on labor supply associated to tax reforms.
Finally, in terms of the third question, “how do our results compare to those emerging
from a standard (single-earner) macroeconomic model?”, we find that reforms introduced
to a version of our economy that mimics a standard macroeconomic model, generates only
a fraction of the long-run output gains. For a proportional consumption tax, the standard
model generates only 85%-89% of the changes in output implied by our framework. Thus,
tax reform exercises in the context of macroeconomic models with single earners can be
misleading if low labor supply elasticities are used.
Background There are several reasons that point to the relevance of our analysis.
First, in the current U.S. tax system the household (not the individual) constitutes the
basic unit of taxation, which may result in high tax rates on secondary earners. A single
woman’s taxes depend only on her own income. Yet, when a married female considers
entering the labor market, the first dollar of her earned income is taxed at her husband’s
current marginal rate. Second, from a conceptual standpoint, wages of each member in a
two-person household affect joint labor supply decisions as well as the reactions to changes
in the tax structure. Thus, the degree of marital sorting (who is married to whom) could
affect the aggregate responses to alternative tax rules. Finally, a common view among many
economists has been that tax changes may have moderate impacts on labor supply. This
view is supported by empirical findings on the low or near zero labor supply elasticities of
prime-age males. Recent developments, however, started to challenge this wisdom. Tax
reforms in the 1980’s have been shown to affect female labor supply behavior significantly,
but have relatively small effects on males (Bosworth and Burtless (1992), Triest (1990), and
Eissa (1995)). More recently, Eissa and Hoynes (2006) show that the disincentives to work
embedded in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for married women are quite significant
(effectively subsidizing some married women to stay at home). These findings are consistent
with ample empirical evidence that female labor supply in general, and female labor force
participation in particular are quite elastic (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)); they point in
the direction of modeling explicitly household labor choices. If households, not individuals,
react to taxes much more than previously thought, the potential effects of tax reforms can
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be more significant.
Our work largely builds on two main strands of literature. First, our evaluation of tax
reforms using a dynamic model with heterogeneity follows the work by Ventura (1999), Altig,
Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001), Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Jime´nez and R´ıos-Rull
(2003), Dı´az-Jime´nez and Pijoan-Mas (2005), Nishiyama and Smetters (2005), Conesa and
Krueger (2006), and Erosa and Koreshkova (2007) among others. In contrast to these papers,
we study economies populated with married and single households, where married households
can have one or two earners. Chade and Ventura (2002) study the effects of tax reforms
on labor supply and assortative matching in a model with heterogenous individuals and
endogenous marriage decisions. These authors, however, abstract from labor supply decisions
along the extensive margin and capital accumulation.3 Second, as Cho and Rogerson (1988),
Mulligan (2001), and Chang and Kim (2006), we study the aggregate effects of changes in
labor supply along the extensive margin. We differ from these papers by explicitly analyzing
the role of the extensive margin for public policy.4
Our paper is also related to two recent literatures. First, it is related to recent work
that argues that the structure of taxation can significantly affect labor choices, and play a
significant role in accounting for cross-country differences in labor supply behavior. Davis
and Henrekson (2003), Olovsson (2003), Prescott (2004), and Rogerson (2006) are examples
of papers in this group. Our paper is also related to recent work that studies female labor
supply in macroeconomic setups; Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2004), Greenwood and
Guner (2004), Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005), Albanesi and Olivetti (2007),
Attanasio, Low and Sa´nchez Marcos (2007) and Knowles (2007) are representative papers
in this group.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an example that highlights the role
of taxation with two-person households, and motivates the parameterization of the model
economy. Section 3 presents the model economy. Section 4 discusses the parameterization
of the model and the mapping to data. Results from tax reforms are presented in section
5. Section 6 quantifies the role of married females and the extensive margin in labor supply.
3Kleven and Kreiner (2006) study optimal taxation of two-person households when households face an
explicit labor force participation decision.
4See Kaygusuz (2006a, 2006b) for recent analysis of tax and social security policies with an extensive
margin in labor supply. See also Hong and Rı´os-Rull (2007) for a recent analysis of the role of social security
in a framework with married and single households.
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Section 7 discusses the implications of a lower labor supply elasticity. Section 8 compares
the results of our framework with those in a standard macroeconomic model. Section 9
concludes.
2 Taxation, Two-Person Households and the Extensive
Margin
In this section, we present a simple two-period example that illustrates how taxes affect
labor supply decisions with two-earner households, with an emphasis on the effects on the
potential changes in labor force participation. The example serves to highlight key features
of our general environment. It also helps understanding some of the calibration choices we
make later.
A one-earner household Consider a married household that lives for two periods;
young (y) and old (o). Suppose household members work only in the first period and retire
in the second one. The household decides whether only one or both members should work
in the first period, and how much to save for the retirement. Let R be the gross interest rate
on savings, and let x and z denote the labor market productivities (wage rates) of males and
females, respectively. Let τ be a proportional labor tax on first period’s labor income.
Consider first the problem if only one member (husband) works. The household problem
is given by
max
lm,1,s1
{2[U((1− τ)zlm,1 − s1 + T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=U(cy)
+ βU(s1R)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= U(co)
]−W (lm,1)},
where lm,1 is the labor choice of the primary earner (husband), s1 are assets for next period
(savings) and T is a transfer received from the government in the first period. The subscript
1 represents the choices of a one-earner household. The functions U(.) and W (.) stand for
the instantaneous utility and disutility, associated to household consumption and worktime,
respectively. Both functions are differentiable; U(.) is strictly concave while W (.) is strictly
convex.
We introduce government transfers in order to capture and illustrate in a simple way the
role of progressive taxation. This follows as household choices under non-linear, progressive
taxes are equivalent to choices under a linear tax system that combines a proportional tax
8
rate plus a lump-sum transfer. Under a progressive tax system, changes in marginal tax rates
affect labor choices even for preferences for which income and substitution effects cancel out;
the same occurs under the linear tax system that we consider.
Household utility when only one member works is given by
V1(τ) = 2[U((1− τ )zl
∗
m,1 − s
∗
1 + T ) + βU(s
∗
1R)]−W (l
∗
m,1),
where a ′∗′ denotes an optimal choice.
A two-earner household Now consider the case when both members work. If this
occurs, the household incurs a utility cost q, drawn from a distribution with c.d.f ζ(q). Then
the problem is given by
max
lm,2,lf,2,s2
{2[U((1− τ)(zlm,2 + xlf,2)− s2 + T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=U(cy)
+ βU(s2R)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=U(co)
]
−W (lm,2)−W (lf,2)− q},
where the subscript 2 represents the choices of a two-earner household. Household utility in
this case equals
V2(τ )− q = 2[U((1− τ)(zl
∗
m,2 + xl
∗
f,2)− s
∗
2 + T ) + βU(s
∗
2R)]
−W (l∗m,2)−W (l
∗
f,2)− q.
Taxes and the extensive margin in labor supply A married household is indif-
ferent between having one and two earners for a sufficiently high value of the utility cost.
Hence, there exists a value of q, call it q∗, that obeys q∗ = V2(τ) − V1(τ). For households
with a q higher than q∗ it is optimal to have only one earner, while for those with a q lower
than q∗, it is optimal to be a two-earner household. From this expression, it is clear that q∗
will change as taxes change. In order to determine how exactly q∗ changes with taxes, we
appeal to the envelope theorem. First note that
∂V1(τ)
∂τ
= −2U ′((1− τ)zl∗m,1 − s
∗
1 + T )(zl
∗
m,1) < 0.
9
Similarly,
∂V2(τ)
∂τ
= −2U ′((1− τ)(zl∗m,2 + xl
∗
f,2)− s
∗
2 + T )(zl
∗
m,2 + xl
∗
f,2) < 0.
Henceforth,
∂q∗
∂τ
=
∂V2(τ )
∂τ
−
∂V1(τ)
∂τ
< 0,
if and only if
U ′((1− τ )(zl∗m,2 + xl
∗
f,2)− s
∗
2 + T )
U ′((1− τ)zl∗m,1 − s
∗
1 + T )
>
zl∗m,1
zl∗m,2 + xl
∗
f,2
.
That is, q∗ and as a result, female labor force participation, will be lower when taxes are
high if and only if the above condition holds. Suppose now that U(c) = log(c).5 In this case,
this condition reduces (after some algebra) to
(1− τ) +
T
(zl∗m,1)
> (1− τ ) +
T
(zl∗m,2 + xl
∗
f,2)
. (1)
Thus, as long as condition (1) holds, lower (higher) taxes on labor will increase (decrease)
the threshold q∗, and generate a higher (lower) labor force participation of the household’s
secondary earner. This is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 1. Thus, a change in tax
rates affects not only the intensive margin in labor supply but also the extensive margin.
Notice that the above condition necessarily holds in our case. If the transfer and the
marginal tax rate are not contingent on the number of earners in the household (as modeled
here), then for a given household type, the labor income in the two earner case will be higher
than in the first earner case. This follows simply from concavity of the utility function.
We note here three things. First, the fact that the transfer and the marginal tax rate are
not contingent on the number of earners in the household captures U.S. tax rules that take
the household as the unit of taxation. From this perspective, a reduction in the marginal
tax rate on the household is effectively a reduction on the tax rate on secondary earners that
may prompt a movement along the extensive margin. Second, the threshold q∗ changes in
response to changes in the tax rate even under log-preferences for consumption, for which
income and substitution effects usually cancel out. Here, the presence of the common transfer
is essential for the movement in q∗, as condition (1) shows. When a transfer is present, and
5This is our case of interest, as we use it in our general environment.
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of course more generally under progressive taxation, changes in marginal tax rates affect not
only q∗, but labor supply along the intensive margin. This occurs as income and substitution
effects no longer cancel out.
Finally, from this analysis, changes in labor supply (in efficiency units) in response to
tax rate changes can be decomposed in two parts: there are changes in labor supply from
males and females currently working (intensive margin), and changes due to female labor
force participation (extensive margin). Assuming that couples differ only in terms of utility
cost they face, aggregate labor supply of married couples (L), can be written as
L = ζ(q∗)[zl∗m,2 + xl
∗
f,2] + (1− ζ(q
∗))zl∗m,1
Hence, the change in aggregate labor supply from tax rate changes is given by
∂L
∂τ
= ζ(q∗)[z
∂l∗m,2
∂τ
+ x
∂l∗f,2
∂τ
] + (1− ζ(q∗))z
∂l∗m,1
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
intensive margin
+ ζ ′(q∗)[zl∗m,2 + xl
∗
f,2 − zl
∗
m,1]
∂q∗
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin
. (2)
This example has important implications for the mapping of our model economy to the
data. As the bottom panel of Figure 1 shows, exactly how much the labor force partici-
pation of married females will increase depends on the shape of ζ(q). Therefore, selecting
the functional form for the distribution of utility costs will be a key part of the model pa-
rameterization; the magnitude of the response along the extensive margin depends on slope
ζ ′(q) as equation (2) illustrates. We capture this slope by exploiting the observed changes
in female labor force participation in response to changes in the gender gap, x/z. The key
to this procedure is that an increase in x, for a given z, implies an increase in labor force
participation whose magnitude hinges precisely on the magnitude of ζ ′(q).
3 The Economic Environment
We study a stationary economy populated by a continuum of males and a continuum of
females. The total mass of agents in each gender is normalized to one. As in Gertler
(1999), individuals have finite lives, that are divided in two stages, work and retirement. In
particular, each agent is born as a worker and faces each period a constant probability of
11
retirement ρ so that average time spent as a worker is 1/ρ. Once an agent retires, he faces a
constant risk of death δ every period so that average time spent in retirement is 1/δ.
Individuals differ in terms of their marital status: they are born either as single or
married, and this marital status does not change over time. In addition, members of a
married household experience identical life-cycle dynamics; i.e. they retire and die together.
Each period working households (married or single) make joint labor supply, consumption
and savings decisions. As in Cho and Rogerson (1988), among other papers, if the female
member of a married household supplies positive amounts of market work, then the household
incurs a utility cost. This utility cost is drawn once and for all at the start of life and remains
constant until the household members retire.
Heterogeneity The labor productivity of a female is denoted by x ∈ X, where X ⊂
R++ is a finite set. Similarly, let the labor productivity of a male be denoted by z ∈ Z,
where Z ⊂ R++ is a finite set. Each agent is born with a particular z or x that remains
constant throughout his/her life. Let Φ(x) and Ω(z) denote the fractions of type-x females
in female population and of type-z males in male population, respectively. Since population
of each gender is normalized to one,
∑
x∈X Φ(x) = 1 and
∑
z∈Z Ω(z) = 1.
Preferences The momentary utility function for a single person is given by
US (c, l) = log(c)−Bl1+
1
γ ,
where c is consumption and l is time devoted to market work.
Married households maximize the sum of their members utilities. We assume that when
the female member of a married household works, the household incurs a utility costs q.
Denoting by χ{lf} the indicator function for joint work, i.e.,
χ{lf} =
{
1, if lf > 0
0, otherwise
,
the utility function for a person of gender i = {f,m} who is married to a person from gender
j 6= i, the momentary utility function reads
UMi (c, li, lj, q) = log(c)− Bl
1+ 1
γ
i −
1
2
χ{lf}q.
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Note that consumption is a public good within the household. Note also that the parameter
γ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply and is independent of gender and marital
status.
We assume that q ∈ Q, where Q ⊂ R++ is a finite set. We assume that for a given house-
hold, the distribution function for q depends on labor market productivity of the husband.
Let ζ(q|z) denote the probability that the cost of joint work is q, with
∑
q∈Q ζ(q|z) = 1
for all z, for a household with male productivity level z. This particular choice for ζ will
become apparent when we discuss our calibration strategy in the next section. At the start
of life, once a particular (x, z) household is formed, the household draws its q, which remains
constant until retirement. We assume that each member of the household incurs half of this
total utility cost.
Production and Markets There are competitive firms that operate a constant returns
to scale technology. Firms rent capital and labor services from households at the rate R and
w, respectively. Using k units of capital and l units of labor, firms produce F (k, l) = kαl1−α
units of consumption good. We assume that the capital depreciates at rate δk.
Households save in the form of a risk-free asset that pays the competitive rate of return
r. There are no markets to insure mortality or retirement risk. We assume that assets of
agents who die are not distributed among those who survive.
Incomes and Taxation Let a represent household’s assets. Then, the total pre-tax
resources of a single working male are given by a + ra + wzl, whereas for a single female
worker they amount to a+ar+wxl. The pre-tax total resources for a married working couple
are given a+ra+wzlm+wxlf . Let b
S
i and b
M indicate the level of social security benefits for
singles, for i = f,m, and married retired households, respectively. Then, retired households
pre-tax resources are simply a + ra + bSi for single retired households, and a + ra + b
M for
married ones.
Income for tax purposes, I, is defined as total labor and capital income; hence for a
single male worker I = ra + wzl, while for a single female worker I = ra + wxl. For a
married working household, taxable income equals I = ra + wzlm + wxlf . We assume that
social security benefits are not taxed, so the income for tax purposes is simply given by ra
for retired households. The total income tax liabilities of married and single households are
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represented by tax functions TM(I) and T S(I), respectively. These functions are continuous
in I, increasing and convex. There is also a (flat) payroll tax that taxes individual labor
incomes, represented by τ p, to fund social security transfers. Besides the income and payroll
taxes, each household pays an additional flat capital income tax for the returns from his/her
asset holdings, denoted by τk.
Demographics Let M(x, z) denote the number of marriages between a type-x female
worker and a type-z male worker, and let ω(z) and φ(x) denote the number of single type-z
male workers and the number of single type-x female workers, respectively. Let M r(x, z),
ωr(z) and φr(x) denote the similar quantities for retirees. Then, the following two accounting
identities
Φ(x) ≡
∑
z
M(x, z) + φ(x) +
∑
z
M r(x, z) + φr(x), (3)
and
Ω(z) ≡
∑
x
M(x, z) + ω(z) +
∑
x
M r(x, z) + ωr(z), (4)
hold by construction. Agents who die (married or single) are replaced by identical young
agents, who are born with no assets. This implies that every period, δM r(x, z) working
married couples are born; the corresponding numbers for singles are δφr(x) and δωr(z).
Note that the law of motion for the number of retired married people reads
M r′(x, z) = (1− δ)M r(x, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
surviving retired couples
+ ρM(x, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
newly retired couples
, (5)
which implies the following steady state condition
δM r(x, z) = ρM(x, z). (6)
Therefore, in a steady state retired couples who die must be replaced by retiring couples
of the same type. Similarly, for single retired males and females, the following steady state
relations must hold
δφr(x) = ρφ(x), (7)
and
δωr(z) = ρω(z). (8)
14
Equations (6), (7) and (8) imply that the number of working agents, married and single,
are constant over time. Using the steady state restrictions implied by equations (6), (7) and
(8), we can rewrite equation (3) as
Φ(x) =
∑
z
M(x, z) +
ρ
δ
∑
z
M(x, z) + φ(x) +
ρ
δ
φ(x). (9)
This equation restricts how Φ(x), M(x, z), and φ(x) are related. Similarly, the steady
state version of equation (4) is given by
Ω(z) =
∑
x
M(x, z) +
ρ
δ
∑
x
M(x, z) + ω(z) +
ρ
δ
ω(z). (10)
When we parameterize the model (see below), our strategy is to treat Φ(x), Ω(z), and
M(x, z) as the primitives and select φ(x) and ω(z) to satisfy the stationarity assumption.
Hence, these two equations allow us to pin down φ(x) and ω(z) given the data on Φ(x),
Ω(z), and M(x, z).
The Problem of a Single Household We now define problems of single and married
households recursively. First, consider the problem of a retired single agent and without loss
of generality focus on the problem of a single retired male with asset level a. A single retired
male simply decides how much to save, a′, and his problem is given by
V S,rm (a) = max
a′≥0
{Us(c, 0) + (1− δ)βV S,rm (a
′)}, (11)
subject to
c+ a′ = a(1 + r) + bSm − T
S(ra)− τ kra.
The value of being a single retired female with assets a, V S,rf (a), is defined in a similar way.
Let aS,rj (a), for j = {f,m}, be the decision rules for retired single agents.
Consider now the problem of a single male worker of type (z, a). A single worker of type-
(z, a) decides how much to work and how much to save, taking into account the retirement
probability, ρ. His problem is given by
V Sm(z, a) = max
a′,lSm
{US(c, lSm) + β[(1− ρ)V
S
m(z, a
′) + ρV S,rm (a
′)]}, (12)
subject to
c+ a′ = a(1 + r) + wzlSm(1− τp)− T
S(wzlSm + ra)− τkra,
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and
lSm ≥ 0, a
′ ≥ 0.
The value of being a single female worker V Sf (x, a) can be defined in a similar fashion.
Again, let aSf (x, a) and a
S
m(z, a) represent the savings decisions for single females and males,
respectively, and let lSf (x, a) and l
S
m(z, a) be their labor supply decision rules.
The Problem of Married Households Again, consider first the problem of a retired
couple with assets a. Their problem, with the associated decision rule aM,r(a), is given by
V M,r(a) = max
a′≥0
{UMm (c, 0, 0, q) + U
M
f (c, 0, 0, q) + (1− δ)βV
M,r(a′)}, (13)
subject to
c+ a′ = a(1 + r) + bM − TM(ra)− τkra.
Consider now the problem of a married working household of type (x, z, a, q). A married
working household solves a joint maximization problem by choosing consumption, next-
period assets and labor supply for each household member. The problem is given by
V M(x, z, a, q) = max
a′, lM
f
, lMm
{[UMm (c, l
M
m , l
M
f , q) + U
M
f (c, l
M
m , l
M
f , q)] (14)
+ β[(1− ρ)V M(x, z, a′, q) + ρV M,r(a′)]},
subject to
c+ a′ = a(1 + r) + w(zlMm + xl
M
f )(1− τp) + ra− T
M(wzlMm + wxl
M
f + ra)− τkra,
and
lMm ≥ 0, l
M
f ≥ 0, a
′ ≥ 0.
Like singles, a married couple decides how much to work and how much to save. Unlike
singles, they might choose zero market hours for female member of the household. This
will occur if q is too high, given the productivity levels x and z and asset holdings a. Let
lMf (x, z, a, q), l
M
m (x, z, a, q), and a
M(x, z, a, q) represent the optimal decision rules associated
with this problem.
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Aggregate Consistency The aggregate state of this economy consists of distribution
of households over their types and asset levels. Suppose a ∈ A = [0, a]. Consider first
workers. Let ψM(B, x, z, q) be the number (measure) of working married households of type
(x, z, q), with assets B ∈ A, the class of Borel subsets of A. Similarly, let ψSf (B, x) be the
number of working single females of type x, with a ∈ B, and let ψSm(B, z) be the number
of single working males of type (z), with a ∈ B. By construction, M(x, z), the number of
married working households of type (x, z), must satisfy
M(x, z) =
∑
q
∫
A
ψM(a, x, z, q)da.
Similarly, the number of single households (agents) must be consistent with ψSf (x, a) and
ψSm(z, a), i.e. φ(x) and ω(z) must satisfy
φ(x) =
∫
A
ψSf (a, x)da,
and
ω(z) =
∫
A
ψSm(a, z)da.
Since retired agents are not allowed to work, they only differ by their marital status and
asset holdings. Let ψM,r(B), ψS,rf (B) and ψ
S,r
m (B) denote the asset distribution among retired
married, retired single female and retired single male households, respectively with a ∈ B.
Like their counterparts for workers, these distributions must be consistent with M r(x, z),
φr(x) and ωr(z).
Equilibrium In stationary equilibrium, factor markets clear, so aggregate capital (K)
and aggregate labor (L) are given by
K =
∑
x, z, q
∫
A
aψM(a, x, z, q)da+
∑
z
∫
A
aψSm(a, z)da+
∑
x
∫
A
aψSf (a, x)da
+
∫
A
aψM,r(a)da+
∫
A
aψS,rm (a)da+
∫
A
aψS,rf (a)da,
and
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L =
∑
x, z, q
∫
A
(xlMf (a, x, z, q) + zl
M
m (a, x, z, q))ψ
M(a, x, z, q)da+
∑
z
∫
A
zlSm(a, z)ψ
S
m(a, z)da+
∑
x
∫
A
xlSf (a, x)ψ
S
f (a, x)da.
In addition, factor prices are competitive so w = F2(K,L), R = F1(K,L), and r = R−δk.
In the Appendix, we provide a formal definition of equilibria.
4 Parameter Values
We now proceed to assign parameter values to the endowment, preference and technology
parameters of our benchmark economy. To this end, we use cross-sectional, aggregate as
well as demographic data. As a first step in this process, we start by defining the length of
a period to be a year.
Demographics and Endowments We assume that agents are workers for forty years,
corresponding to ages 25 to 64, and set ρ = 1/40 accordingly. Absent population growth
in the model, we set δ so that the model is consistent with the observed fraction of retired
individuals (65 years and above), as a fraction of the population 25 years and older. From
the 2000 Census, we calculate that this fraction was 0.203. Hence, given the value assumed
for ρ, we set δ equal to 0.0982 in order to reproduce the same age structure in the benchmark
economy.
We set the number of productivity types (labor endowments) to five. Each productivity
type corresponds to an educational attainment level: less than high school (< hs), high
school (hs), some college (sc), college (col) and post-college education (> col). We use data
from the Consumer Population Survey (CPS) to calculate efficiency levels for all types of
agents. Efficiency levels correspond to mean hourly wage rates within an education group,
which we construct using annual wage and salary income, weeks worked, and usual hours
worked data.6 We include in the sample household heads and spouses between 25 and 54,
and exclude those who are self-employed or unpaid workers. Table 1 shows the estimated
efficiency levels for the corresponding types, where wage rates for each type and gender are
6We find the mean hourly wages as annual wage and salary income(usual hours worked)(number of weeks worked) .
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normalized by the overall mean hourly wages in the sample. The Table also reports the
observed gender gap in hourly wage rates for each educational group; the gap is roughly
constant across educational categories, averaging about 72%.
We subsequently determine the distribution of individuals by productivity types for each
gender, i.e. Ω(z) and Φ(x), using the 2000 Census. For this purpose, we assume an under-
lying stationary demographic data, and assume that the distribution of retired agents by
educational attainment is the same as the observed distribution of agents prior to retirement.
Given this assumption, we consider all household heads or spouses who are between ages 25
and 64 and for each gender calculate the fraction of population in each education cell. For
the same age group, we also construct M(x, z), the distribution of married working couples,
as shown in Table 2. Consistent with positive assortative matching by education, the largest
entries in each row and column in Table 2 are located along the diagonal.7
Finally, given the fractions of individuals in each education group, Φ(x) and Ω(z), and
the fractions of married working households, M(x, z), in the data, we calculate the implied
fractions of single working households, ω(z) and φ(x), reported in Table 3. About 74% of
households in the benchmark economy consists of married households, while the rest (about
26%) are single-person ones. This table also shows ω(z) and φ(x) that we construct from
the 2000 Census. The mismatch between implied and actual values of ω(z) and φ(x) is quite
small, suggesting that stationary population structure is not an unrealistic assumption.
Technology We specify the production function as Cobb-Douglas with capital share
equal to 0.317. In the absence of population growth and growth in labor efficiency, we set
the depreciation rate equal to 0.07. These values are consistent with a notion of capital that
excludes residential capital, consumer durables and government owned capital for the period
1960-2000. The corresponding notion of output is then GDP accounted for by the business
sector. Altogether, this implies a capital to output ratio of about 2.325.8
Taxation To construct income tax functions for married and single individuals, we
estimate effective taxes paid by married and single households as a function of their reported
7See Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2005) for a recent theoretical and empirical study of positive assor-
tative matching by education.
8See Guner, Ventura and Yi (2007) for details.
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income. We use tabulated data from the Internal Revenue Service by income brackets.9 For
each income bracket, total income taxes paid, total income earned, number of taxable returns
and number of returns data are publicly available. Using these, we find the mean income
and the average tax rate corresponding to every income bracket. We calculate the average
tax rates as
average tax rate =
{ total amount of income tax paid
number of taxable returns
}
{ total adjusted gross income
number of returns
}
.
Following Gouveia and Strauss (1994), we then estimate the effective tax functions both for
married and single households. In particular, we fit the following equation to the data,
average tax rate (income) = η1 + η2 log(income) + ε,
where average tax (income) is the average tax rate that applies when average income in an
income bracket equals income. We calculate income by normalizing average income in each
income bracket by the mean household income in 2000. Table 4 shows the estimates of the
coefficients for married and single households.
Given these estimates, we specify the tax functions in the benchmark model as
TM(income) = [0.1023 + 0.0733 log(income)]income,
and
T S(income) = [0.1547 + 0.0497 log(income)]income.
Figures 2 and 3 display estimated average and marginal tax rates for different multiples
of household income. Our estimates imply that a single person with twice mean household
income in 2000 faces an average tax rate of about 18.9% and a marginal tax rate equal to
about 23.9%. The corresponding rates for a married household with the same income are
about 15.3% and 22.6%.
Finally, we need to assign a value for the (flat) capital income tax rate τ k, which we use
to proxy the corporate income tax. We estimate this tax rate as the one that reproduces
the observed level of tax collections out of corporate income taxes after the major reforms of
1986. For the period 1987-2000, such tax collections averaged about 1.92% of GDP. Using
the technology parameters we calibrate in conjunction with our notion of output (business
9Source: Internal Revenue Service (2000), Statistic of Income Division, Individual Income Tax Returns
Bulletin (Publication 1304). See Kaygusuz (2006a) for further details.
20
GDP), we obtain τk = 0.124. In the benchmark economy total taxes, income taxes on labor
and capital and the additional tax on capital, amount to 13.1% of aggregate output.
Social Security We calculate τp = 0.086, as the average value of the social security
contributions as a fraction of aggregate labor income for 1990-2000 period.10 Using Social
Security Beneficiary Data, we calculate that during this same period a retired single woman
obtained old-age benefits of about 0.77 of a single retired male, while a retired couple averaged
benefits of about 1.5 times those of a retired single male. Thus, given the payroll tax rate,
the value of the benefit for a single retired male, bSm, balances the budget for the social
security system.
Preferences There are two utility functions parameters, the intertemporal elasticity of
labor supply (γ) and the parameter governing the disutility of market work (B). We consider
two values for γ: a low value of 0.2 and a higher value of 0.4. Both values are consistent with
recent estimates for males. While γ = 0.2 is in line with microeconomic evidence reviewed
by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), γ = 0.4 is contained in the range of recent estimates
by Domeij and Floden (2006, Table 5). Domeij and Floden (2006) results are based upon
estimates for married males that control for the bias emerging from borrowing constraints.11
We proceed by presenting first results when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals
0.4. In subsequent sections, we discuss the implications of a lower value for this parameter.
Given γ, we select the parameter B to reproduce average market hours per worker observed
in the data. These average hours per worker amounted to about 40.8% of available time in
2000.12
We assume that the utility cost parameter is distributed according to a (flexible) gamma
distribution, with parameters kz and θz. Thus, conditional on the husband’s type z,
10The contributions considered are those from the Old Age, Survivors and DI programs. The Data comes
from the Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2005, Tables 4.A.3.
11Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (2000) provide estimates within a similar range in the presence of a home
production margin. Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2007) report an estimate of 0.2, using a model
with incomplete markets.
12The numbers are for people between ages 25 and 54 and are based on data from the Consumer Population
Survey. We find mean yearly hours worked by all males and females by multiplying usual hours worked in
a week and number of weeks worked. Married males work 2294 hours per year, and married females work
1741 hours per year. We assume that each person has an available time of 5000 hours per year. Our target
for hours corresponds to 2040 hours per-year.
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q ∼ ζ(q|z) ≡ qkz−1
exp(−q/θz)
Γ(kz)θ
kz
z
,
where Γ(.) is the Gamma function. By proceeding in this way, we exploit the information
contained in the changes in the labor force participation of married females as their own
wage rate increases with education (for a given husband type). We emphasize that this
allows us to control the slope of the distribution of utility costs. As we argued in section 2,
the shape of the distribution of utility costs is potentially critical in assessing the effects of
tax changes on labor force participation.
Using CPS data, we calculate that the employment-population ratio of married females
between ages 25 and 54, for each of the educational categories defined earlier.13 Table 5
shows the resulting distribution of the labor force participation of married females by the
productivities of husbands and wives for married households. The aggregate labor force
participation for this group is 69.4%, and it increases from 44.8% for the lowest education
group to 82.5% for the highest. Our strategy is then to select the two parameters governing
the gamma distribution, for every husband type, so as to reproduce each of the rows (five
entries) in Table 5 as closely as possible. Altogether, this process requires estimating 10
parameters (i.e. a pair (θ, k) for each husband educational category).
It is important to note that selecting a particular ζ(q|z) function restricts the elasticities
of female labor supply along the extensive margin. Tables 1 and 5 allow us to calculate
these elasticities in a straightforward manner. Take, for example, females who are married
to males with some college education and compare those with some college education to
ones with college education. The labor force participation rises by about 10.6% while the
wages increase by about 32%, implying an elasticity of labor force participation of about
0.34. If we repeat the same exercise for women with college and with post college education,
the implied elasticity turns out to be about 0.28. Similar calculations can be repeated for
any two adjacent entries of a particular raw in Table 5. These elasticities range from 0.1
(comparing women with college and with post college education who are married to men
with high school education) to 1.6 (comparing women with less than high school and with
high school education who are married to men with less than high school education), while
for the bulk of the population they are on the order of 0.3-0.5. These elasticities are well
13We consider all individuals who are not in armed forces.
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within the available empirical estimates. Eissa (1995), using 1986 tax reform as a natural
experiment, estimates an elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage of approximately 0.8
and claims that at least half of the responsiveness is on the participation margin. Triest
(1990) estimates an uncompensated wage elasticities for married women on the order of
0.86-1.12, and suggests that almost all action comes from the extensive margin.
Finally, we choose the remaining preference parameter, the discount factor β, so that the
steady-state capital to output ratio matches the value in the data consistent with our choice
of the technology parameters (2.325). Table 6 summarizes our parameter choices. Table 7
shows the performance of the benchmark model in terms of the targets we impose for B and
β, i.e. labor hours per-worker and capital output ratio. The table also shows how well the
benchmark calibration matches the labor force participation of married females. Although,
as we explained above, our calibration strategy is to match each row of Table 5, it is more
instructive to look at the aggregate participation rate of married females and the labor force
participation of married females by their educational level. The model has no problem in
reproducing jointly these observations as the table demonstrates.
5 Tax Reforms
We now consider four hypothetical reforms to the current U.S. tax structure: a proportional
consumption tax, a proportional income tax, a progressive consumption tax, and a move from
joint to separate filing for married couples. The first reform flattens the current income tax
schedule and changes the tax base from income to consumption, effectively eliminating the
taxation of capital income built into the income tax. The second reform only flattens the tax
schedule while keeping income as the tax base. The third reform reintroduces progressivity
into a consumption tax system. Finally, the last reform changes the unit of taxation from
households to individuals.
The findings we report are based on steady state comparisons of pre and post-reform
economies. In all reforms, we keep the additional tax rate on capital income (τ k) and the
social security system unchanged.14 The exercises are in all cases revenue neutral.
14Results when the tax rate on capital income is also eliminated are available upon request.
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A Proportional Consumption Tax The first reform replaces current income taxes
with a proportional consumption tax, which makes marginal and average tax rates equal for
all households. For a better understanding of the results, the reader should bear in mind that
a consumption tax still distorts labor choices, but by construction eliminates the distortions
on capital accumulation created by the income tax.
Table 8 reports key findings from this exercise. In line with the existing literature, the
effects of a consumption tax on aggregates are dramatic. Aggregate output increases by
about 11.2%. As a result, a flat consumption tax of 17.8% is all that is needed to generate
revenue neutrality. The long-run rise in output is fueled by significant rises in factor inputs.
The capital-to-output ratio increases by about 15% in the post-reform steady state. Total
(raw) hours in turn increase by 4.7%, while labor supply (hours adjusted by efficiency units)
increases by 4.2%. Despite the rise in labor supply, as a result of higher capital stock in
post-reform economy, the wage rate increases by 6.5% as well.
Our economy allows us to identify and quantify differential responses in labor supply to
tax changes that takes place at the intensive margin for both males and females, as well as
at the extensive margin for married females. Recall that in the benchmark economy, the
tax structure generates non-trivial disincentives to work since marginal tax rates increase
with incomes. In particular, married females who decide to enter the labor force are taxed
at their partner’s current marginal tax rate. With the elimination of these disincentives, in
conjunction with the partial removal of capital income taxation, the change in labor supply of
married females is substantially larger than the aggregate change in hours. The introduction
of a consumption tax implies that the labor force participation of married females increases
by 7.3%, while hours per worker rise by about 2.6% for females, and about 2.8% for males.
Due to changes along the intensive and the extensive margin, total hours for married females
increase by about 10.6%. This is a dramatic rise and is more than three times the change
in total male hours. These results are especially worth noting as the parameter governing
intertemporal substitution of labor is the same for males and females.
A Proportional Income Tax The second reform is similar to the first one but in-
troduces a proportional income tax instead of a proportional consumption tax. The conse-
quences of this reform could then be viewed as the consequences of simply flattening-out the
current income tax schedule.
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The key finding from this exercise is that the resulting rise in labor supply is smaller but
similar to the one in the consumption tax case, 4.7% versus 4.3%. This suggests that the
main contribution to changes in the labor input comes from the flattening of the tax schedule.
Hours per workers for males and females increase by about 2.6% and 2.3%, respectively, and
total hours increase by about 4.3%. Again, the rise in total hours by married females is very
pronounced, of about 9.3%, and again more than three times the change in total male hours.
In relation to the case with a proportional consumption tax, the effects on capital ac-
cumulation are now less pronounced. This is expected: an income tax, differently from a
consumption tax, still distorts asset accumulation decisions. Consequently, the capital-to-
output ratio increases by just 4.5%. Overall, as a result of smaller rises in both labor and
capital inputs, the effects on aggregate output (although still substantial) are smaller than
under a proportional consumption tax. In the current case the change in output amounts to
about 5.9%, whereas under proportional consumption taxes the effects are almost twice as
big: 11.2%.
A Progressive Consumption Tax In our third exercise we consider a progressive
consumption tax, which consists of an exemption level below which households do not pay
taxes, and a proportional tax on household consumption applied above this level. To il-
lustrate the consequences of different exemption levels, we consider a ‘high’ exemption case
and a ‘low’ exemption case. The ‘high’ exemption amounts to 1/3 of mean consumption in
our benchmark economy for single households, and 1/2 of mean consumption in our bench-
mark economy for married ones. The ‘low’ exemption equals 1/4 of mean consumption in
our benchmark economy for married households, and 1/6 of aggregate consumption in our
benchmark economy for single ones.15 We emphasize that these exemption levels are defined
as multiples of consumption in the benchmark case; as a result, they do not vary when
consumption changes (increases) as a result of the reform in question.
Results are reported in Table 9. Under a high exemption, the reform requires a tax rate
of 27.5% whereas under a low exemption the required rate is 21.5%; the corresponding rate
under a proportional consumption tax was 17.8%. A comparison between proportional and
progressive consumption tax reforms (Tables 8 and 9) is quite revealing. The effects on
15In 2005, consumption per-person 25 years old and above was about $45,110. Thus, the value of the high
(low) exemption for a married couple is approximately $22,555 ($11,253).
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capital intensity are comparable under both types of reforms. This should not be surprising
since the bulk of capital is owned by households who are above the exemption levels and they
are affected in a similar way in these reforms; both reforms eliminate the distorting effects
of income taxes on their asset accumulation decisions. The effect on aggregate output in
the long run, however, is now lower than under a proportional consumption tax and declines
steeply with increases in exemption levels. This is clearly due to the smaller increases in
the labor input. Note that hours and the labor input increase by about 1.5% with the high
exemption level and 3.6-3.2% with the low one, whereas the increase was about 4.7% and
4.2%, respectively, under a proportional consumption tax.
It is important to understand the channels that lead to a much smaller rise in aggregate
labor under a progressive consumption tax than under a proportional one. We start by
noting that for households at the top of the skill distribution and therefore above the ex-
emption threshold, the relevant marginal tax distorting labor choices is larger than under a
proportional consumption tax. This high marginal tax rate, in conjunction with the implicit
transfer associated to a progressive tax, results in a lower response from these households in
terms of work hours. In turn, the effect on households at the top has an important effect on
aggregate labor in efficiency units, as these households have a disproportionate contribution
to this variable. A progressive consumption tax reform also discourages labor supply at the
bottom of skill distribution as these households have incentives to stay below the exemption
level. These phenomena are present in previous studies with heterogeneity, such as Altig et
al (2001), Conesa and Krueger (2006), Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) and Ventura (1999).
The current framework, however, allows us to uncover the differential effects of a pro-
gressive consumption tax on the labor force participation of married females. Consider first
the case of high exemption level. The rise in labor force participation in this case is less than
half of the rise under a proportional consumption tax (3.2% versus 7.3%). This is a central
result regarding the expected effects of a tax reform of this sort. The key for this finding
is the structure of progressive consumption tax, which combines an exemption level and a
common marginal tax rate above it. The interplay of these features discourages changes in
labor force participation in married households with relatively less skilled members. When
females in such households enter the labor force, some of these households face a positive
(rather than zero) marginal tax rate. Therefore, the bulk of them choose not to enter the
labor force. It turns out that these households were the ones that respond the most under
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proportional tax reforms; as we discuss in detail below. When we lower the exemption level,
the number of households that face this trade-off becomes smaller, and the results look more
similar to the ones obtained under a proportional consumption tax reform.
Separate Filing A common critique of the current U.S. tax system is that it treats
married and single individuals differently. The problem arises since the unit subject to
taxation is the household, not the individual, with tax schedules that differ according to
marital status. This creates much discussed marriage-tax penalties and bonuses, affecting
the marginal tax rates that married individuals face. In particular, note that when a married
female enters the labor market the first dollar of her earned income is taxed at her husband’s
current marginal rate, potentially distorting her labor supply in a critical way. This reasoning
motivates our final experiment, where we move from the current system to one in which each
individual files his/her taxes separately, or separate filing. We assume that all individuals,
married and single, face the same tax schedule, the one faced by singles in the benchmark
economy, T S(.), and assume that a married person’s tax liabilities consists of his/her labor
income plus half of household’s asset income. In addition, in order to collect the same
amount of tax revenue as the benchmark economy, we assume that each individual faces an
additional proportional tax (or subsidy) on his/her income.16
Given Figures 3, the move from TM(.) to T S(.) would have a relatively small effect on
marginal tax rates. The possibility of separate filing, however, can lower taxes on married
females significantly. Consider a household with total income in the economy equal to twice
mean household income, and suppose earnings of both members are equal. Under the current
system, this household faces a marginal tax rate of about 23%. The marginal tax rate declines
to less than 20% if the household income is split equally between husband and wife. The
gain is larger for majority of wives who make less than their husbands.
The effects of a move from the current system to separate filing are substantial. Table
9 shows that aggregate output goes up by about 2.6%. This is almost half of the increase
associated with a proportional income tax reform. In contrast to other reforms, the increase
in aggregate output comes almost fully from the rise in aggregate hours by married females.
The labor force participation of married females rises by 5.9% (almost as much as it does
with a proportional income and consumption taxes), and aggregate hours by married females
16It turns out that a subsidy of 1.5% is needed to achieve revenue-neutrality.
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increase by 7.3%. In contrast, hours by male workers are nearly constant. The main mes-
sage from this experiment is quite clear. A move from the current system to one in which
individuals (not households) are the basic unit of taxation, goes a long way in generating
significant effects on aggregate labor and output. Note that this occurs without eliminating
tax progressivity, or the taxation of capital income.
Discussion The analysis so far reveals several important insights that a single-agent
framework would fail to capture. Notice that female labor force participation plays a sig-
nificant role in all of the reforms we have considered. Under proportional taxes, the overall
rise in married female hours is more than three times the rise in male hours, and fueled by a
significant increase in the extensive margin. Furthermore, the structure of reforms interact
in a nontrivial way with the labor force participation of married females. The increases in the
labor force participation, as well as aggregate hours of married females, under a progressive
consumption tax reform can be much lower than those under a proportional consumption
tax reform. Overall, these findings motivate us to explicitly quantify the relative importance
of married females for our results. We do this in the next section.
6 The Role of Married Females
We now discuss in detail the changes in labor supply of married females. We ask: what is the
overall contribution of married females to changes in labor supply? What is the importance
of labor supply changes along the extensive margin?
In answering these questions, we first note that the type of the tax reform under consider-
ation is critical. Although the aggregate effects on labor supply are smaller under progressive
consumption tax relative to a proportional one, the rise in married females’s labor supply
becomes a much more important component of the overall rise in labor supply (i.e. labor
in efficiency units). Furthermore, the role of married females is largest with a move to sep-
arate filing. Table 10 makes these points clear. In this table we report the contribution
of married females to changes in total hours and total labor supply under our benchmark
calibration. For proportional consumption and income taxes, the contribution of married fe-
males to changes in total hours is around 58-59%. Nevertheless, the contribution of married
females to changes in total hours is much higher under a progressive consumption tax: about
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65% and 80% for the low and high exemption values, respectively. This occurs as changes
in labor supply for other groups are of smaller or negative magnitude under a progressive
consumption tax.17 Married females’ contributions are largest in separate filing reform; they
contribute to more than 90% of changes in total hours. The contributions of married females
to total labor supply follow a similar pattern, but the magnitudes are smaller. This occurs
since females on average are less skilled than men, and since the rise in female labor supply
is concentrated among low skilled ones, an issue that we elaborate below. The results in
Table 10 indicate that married females account for about 49-50% of the changes in labor
supply under proportional taxes, about 55% and 65% of the changes under a progressive
consumption tax, and almost about 90% under separate filing. We conclude that the overall
contribution of married females is substantial; they contribute disproportionately to changes
in labor supply given their share of the working age population (about 37.5%).
In the bottom panel of Table 10 we focus on the role of the extensive margin and report
its contribution to the rise in hours and total labor supply. In order to calculate the role of
extensive margin, we count both the hours worked by married females who enter the labor
market, as well as by those who stop participating. The latter is necessary as some married
females, in particular those with low skills after a progressive consumption tax reform, prefer
not to work in the post-reform economy. Concretely, for each (x, z, a, q)-type married woman,
we first determine if labor force participation for this type is different between pre and post
reform economies. If the change in participation is positive and a married woman enters
the labor force after a reform, we weigh the change in participation by the hours she works
(or the total labor she supplies) under the new tax system. Summing up over all such
households gives us the total rise in hours (or in labor supply) due to extensive margin. If,
on the other hand, the change is negative and a married woman stops working, we weigh
the change in participation by the hours she worked (or total labor she supplied) in the
benchmark economy. The difference between these two sums gives us the net change in
hours (or total labor supply) due to the extensive margin. Using this measure, the extensive
margin contributes about 49-51% of the changes in total hours under proportional taxes,
about 57% and 71% of the changes under progressive taxes, and about 77% under separate
17The interplay of high marginal tax rates and an exemption value, dictates that the bulk of single
individuals decrease hours worked after the reform in the high exemption case. For single females, only
those with college education increase hours (0.2%). For single males, an increase in hours takes place for
those with college education or above (0.6% and 0.8%, respectively).
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filing. For changes in labor supply, the contributions are 41-43%, about 47% and 55%, and
about 82% respectively. By this measure, these calculations suggest that the bulk of the
rise in the labor supply of married females can be attributed to movements in the extensive
margin.
A central finding emerging from our proportional tax exercises is that the increase in
labor force participation of married females becomes larger as we move towards the bottom
of the distribution of skills. Table 11 illustrates this point. In the table, households are
arranged according to the skill type of the female member (from high school education or
less to post-college education), and the resulting change in the labor force participation of
married females is displayed. Both with a proportional consumption tax and a proportional
income tax, the rise in female labor force participation for the lowest educational category
is remarkable. These females increase their labor force participation by 22.5% under a
proportional consumption tax system and by nearly 20% under a proportional income tax
system. Under both reforms, the percentage increase in labor force participation decreases
monotonically; from about 22.5% to about 2.7% under a proportional consumption tax and
from about 20% to about 1.7% under a proportional income tax. A very similar pattern
emerges in separate filing reform. Thus, the bulk of the changes along the extensive margin
take place in households with relatively less skilled members.
The results with a progressive consumption tax are different. With the high exemption
level, the labor force participation of the lowest skill types is only about 1% higher than in
the benchmark economy. The behavior of married females is affected significantly here: a
higher labor force participation can move these households above the exemption threshold
and change their marginal tax rate from zero to about 21.5% and 27.5%. This clearly
generates disincentives for labor force participation. Once we move to households with a
female member who has more than high school education, the pattern is similar to what we
observe with proportional income or consumption taxes. With the low exemption level, as
the number of married household below the threshold is reduced, the results are similar to
ones obtained by the proportional consumption tax reform.
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7 The Importance of the Intertemporal Elasticity
We now turn our attention to the role of the preference parameter γ; the micro intertemporal
elasticity of labor supply. For these purposes, we report results for the value on the low side of
the empirical estimates for this parameter (γ = 0.2), and calibrate the rest of the parameters
following the procedure discussed in Section 4. In particular, we recover new parameters for
the distribution of utility costs so as to reproduce the facts on labor force participation.
Our results are summarized in Table 12. The key finding is that the importance of married
females for the aggregate effects of tax reforms increases. As the table demonstrates, the
contribution of married females to changes in labor hours and labor supply substantially
goes up. For instance, the contribution to changes in hours now ranges from about 76% to
98% across experiments, while under the higher value, γ = 0.4, the contribution ranged from
50% to 92%.
These results are driven by the behavior of labor force participation under the low elas-
ticity value. Note that changes in hours per-worker are much smaller than under γ = 0.4,
but changes in labor force participation are larger. Since adjusting along the intensive mar-
gin is costlier with a low γ, married households find optimal to adjust hours worked largely
along the extensive margin. This, in conjunction with the fact that the model under γ = 0.2
has still to respect the underlying data on labor force participation, renders the substantial
response of married females displayed in Table 12. In other words, a lower value of the labor
supply elasticity implies a higher aggregate labor supply response from married females in
tax reforms.
An implication of these findings on labor supply is that the impact of reforms on the
size of the labor hours is not too different across the two values of γ. To illustrate this
phenomenon, note first that the behavior of male per-worker hours under a consumption
tax: they change by about 2.8% with γ = 0.4, and just by 1.4% with γ = 0.2. Total hours,
in contrast, change by an almost equal amount with both values of γ (about 4.7% and 4.6%).
We conclude from these exercises that the precise value for this parameter is of second-order
importance for understanding the aggregate effects of tax reforms on labor supply.
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8 Comparisons with a Standard Macro Framework
How do our results compare to those emerging from standard macroeconomic setup with
heterogenous agents? To answer this question, we consider an economy with only single
earner households, and eliminate all gender-based differences in wage rates and social security
transfers. We use data on males to calibrate wage rates and the relative sizes of productivity
groups, and impose the tax functions pertaining to married households. Altogether, these
assumptions render a macroeconomic model with heterogenous agents consistent with those
in the literature; e.g. Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Ventura (1999).
Results are displayed in Table 13 in the case of a consumption tax, for two values of the
elasticity γ. The results show that for the high value of γ, the standard framework captures
only about 89% of the output gains under the current framework, and about 83% of the
changes in aggregate labor supply. For the low value of γ, not surprisingly, the fraction
captured by the standard framework of output is smaller, and substantially smaller for the
case of labor supply; about 85% and 51%, respectively. It is worth noting that these results
are obtained even when male hours respond more in the standard framework than in the
current one. This follows as in the current framework, married households adjust labor
supply of both spouses.
An important implication from these findings is that tax reform exercises can be mis-
leading if a ’standard’ framework is used with low labor supply elasticities. The results in
Table 13 provide a careful, model-based and quantitative argument for the use of high labor
supply elasticities in the context of tax reforms.
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the aggregate effects of tax reforms for the US economy, taking
seriously into account the labor supply decisions of married females and the underlying
structure of household heterogeneity. For these purposes, and differently from the existing
literature, our model economy consists of one and two-earner households, where two-earner
households face explicit labor supply decisions along both intensive and extensive margins.
We find that tax changes can lead to large effects across steady states on aggregate
variables. We explicitly quantify the relative importance of changes in the labor supply of
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different groups, and find that married females play a critical role in these changes. We
find that when current taxes are replaced by proportional taxes, married females account
for around 58-59% of the total increase in labor hours, and about 49-50% of the aggregate
increase in labor in efficiency units. When current taxes are replaced by progressive con-
sumption taxes, married females contribute even more to changes in hours and labor supply
depending on the exemption value (65% and 55% in the low case, and 80% and 65% in the
high). Finally, when the current tax system is replaced with one that taxes individuals, not
households, the rise in aggregate labor supply almost entirely comes from married females.
We also calculate that the bulk of the changes accounted for by married females can be
attributed to movements along the extensive margin.
We also find that when preferences are consistent with a labor supply elasticity on the
low side of available estimates, the labor supply behavior of married females becomes even
more important. In this case, married females account for at least three fourths of the
changes in hours in a tax reform, as households adjust work hours largely by movements
along the extensive margin. We conclude from these exercises that the value of this preference
parameter is of second-order importance in understanding the effects on output and labor
supply associated to tax reforms. Finally, reforms in a standard version of the model,
populated only by single agents, result in output gains that are up to 15% lower than our
benchmark economy.
Our results have serious implications for policy. One of these implications relates to the
interplay between distorting taxes, and other non-tax barriers to female labor force partic-
ipation. Such barriers include the restrictive regulation of temporary work, and product
market distortions such as restrictions on shopping hours, that are common in several devel-
oped economies. If married females drive the bulk of hour changes associated to tax reforms,
these obstacles to increasing participation can interact with changes in the tax structure, and
prevent the large predicted changes in labor supply to materialize. From this perspective,
a more complete analysis of taxation and labor supply should study these issues. We leave
this and other extensions for future work.
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9.1 Appendix: Definition of Equilibrium
Let ψM(B, x, z, q) denote the number of married individuals with assets a ∈ B, when the
female is of type x, the male is of type z, and the household faces a utility cost q of joint
work. This function (measure) is defined for all Borel sets B ∈ A, all x, z, q ∈ X × Z × Q.
The measures ψSf (B, x) (single females), ψ
S
m(B, z) (single males), ψ
M,r(B) (retired married
couples), ψS,rf (B, x) (retired single females) and ψ
S,r
m (B, x) (retired single males) are defined
in similar way.
Let χ{.} denote the indicator function. The measures defined above obey the following
recursions:
Married working agents:
ψM(B, x, z, q) = (1− ρ)
∫
ψM(a, x, z, q)χ{aM(a, x, z, q) ∈ B}da
+ δM r(x, z)ζ(q|z)χ{0 ∈ B},
Single working agents:
ψSf (B, x) = (1− ρ)
∫
ψSf (a, x)χ{a
S
f (a, x) ∈ B}da+ δφ
r(x)χ(a′)χ{0 ∈ B},
ψSm(B, z) = (1− ρ)
∫
ψSm(a, z)χ{a
S
m(a, x) ∈ B}da+ δω
r(x)χ{0 ∈ B}.
Married retired agents:
ψM,r(B) = (1− δ)
∫
ψM,r(a)χ{aM,r(a) ∈ B}da+ ρ
∑
x,z,q
∫
ψM(a, x, z, q)χ{aM(a, x, z, q) ∈ B}da,
Single retired agents:
ψS,rf (B) = (1− δ)
∫
ψS,rf (a)χ{a
S,r
f (a) ∈ B}da+ ρ
∑
x
∫
ψSf (x, a)χ{a
S
f (a, x) ∈ B}da,
ψS,rm (B) = (1− δ)
∫
ψS,rm (a)χ{a
S,r
m (a) ∈ B}da+ ρ
∑
z
∫
ψSm(a, z)χ{a
S
m(a, z) ∈ B}da.
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Equilibrium Definition: For a given government consumption level G, social security
tax benefits bM , bSf and b
S
m, tax functions T
S(.), TM(.), a payroll tax rate τp, a capital
tax rate τk, and an exogenous demographic structure represented by Ω(z), Φ(x), M(x, z),
a stationary equilibrium consists of prices r and w, aggregate capital (K) and labor (L),
household decision rules lMf (a, x, z, q), l
M
m (a, x, z, q), l
S
m(a, z), l
S
f (a, x), a
M(a, x, z, q), aSm(a, z),
aSf (a, x), a
M,r(a), aS,rm (a), and a
S,r
f (a), and measures ψ
M , ψSf , ψ
S
m, ψ
M,r, ψS,rf and ψ
S,r
m such
that
1. Given tax rules and factor prices, the decision rules of households are optimal.
2. Factor prices are competitively determined; i.e. w = F2(K,L), and r = F1(K,L)− δk.
3. Factor markets clear; i.e.,
K =
∑
x, z, q
∫
A
aψM(a, x, z, q)da+
∑
z
∫
A
aψSm(a, z)da+
∑
x
∫
A
aψSf (a, x)da
+
∫
A
aψM,r(a)da+
∫
A
aψS,rm (a)da+
∫
A
aψS,rf (a)da,
L =
∑
x, z, q
∫
A
(xlMf (a, x, z, q) + zl
M
m (a, x, z, q))ψ
M(a, x, z, q)da+
∑
z
∫
A
zlSm(a, z)ψ
S
m(a, z)da+
∑
x
∫
A
xlSf (a, x)ψ
S
f (a, x)da.
4. The measures ψM , ψSf , ψ
S
m, ψ
M,r, ψS,rf and ψ
S,r
m are consistent with individual decisions.
5. The Government Budget and Social Security Budgets are Balanced; i.e.,
G =
∑
x,z,q
∫
A
TM(.)ψM(a, x, z, q)da+
∑
z
∫
A
T S(.)ψSm(a, z)da
+
∑
x
∫
A
T S(.)ψSf (a, x)da+ τkK,
∫
A
bMψM,r(a)da+
∫
A
bSfψ
S,r
f (a)da+
∫
A
bSmψ
S,r
m (a)da = τ pwL
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Table 1: Productivity Levels, by Type, by Gender
Males (z) Females (x) x/z
<hs 0.709 0.505 0.712
hs 0.920 0.669 0.727
sc 1.113 0.799 0.718
col 1.447 1.052 0.727
>col 1.809 1.326 0.733
Note: Entries are the productivity levels of males and females, using 2000 data
from the Consumer Population Survey. These levels are constructed as hourly
wages for each type –see text for details.
Table 2: Distribution of Married Working Households by Type, %
Female
Male <hs hs sc col >col
<hs 6.76 4.24 2.32 0.39 0.17
hs 3.15 13.49 7.29 1.83 0.68
sc 1.75 7.44 13.51 4.32 1.56
col 0.39 2.36 5.76 7.58 2.61
>col 0.17 0.90 2.63 4.42 4.27
Note: Entries show the fractions of the total married pool, by wife and husband
educational categories. The data used is from the U.S. 2000 Census –see text for
details.
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Table 3: Fraction of Agents By Type, By Gender, and Marital Status
Males Females
All Married Singles Singles (data) All Married Singles Singles (data)
<hs 0.1439 0.1028 0.0411 0.0386 0.1360 0.0904 0.0456 0.0403
hs 0.2659 0.1958 0.0701 0.0703 0.2793 0.2105 0.0688 0.0679
sc 0.2891 0.2115 0.0776 0.0773 0.3159 0.2331 0.0828 0.0848
col 0.1858 0.1384 0.0474 0.0488 0.1760 0.1373 0.0387 0.0423
>col 0.1153 0.0915 0.0238 0.0250 0.0928 0.0687 0.0241 0.0247
Total: 1.0000 0.74 0.26 0.26 1.0000 0.74 0.26 0.26
Note: Entries show the fraction of individuals in each educational category, by
marital status, constructed under the assumption of a stationary population
structure –see text for details. The last column in each panel shows the cor-
responding values in U.S. 2000 Census data.
Table 4: Tax Parameters
η̂1 η̂2
Married 0.1023 0.0733
R2 0.99
Single 0.1547 0.0497
R2 0.93
Note: Entries show the parameter estimates for the postulated tax function.
These result from regressing effective average tax rates against household in-
come, using 2000 data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service – see text for
details.
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Table 5: Labor Force Participation of Married Females (%)
Female
Male <hs hs sc col >col
<hs 41.1 62.5 72.1 77.4 70.9
hs 49.1 67.7 77.6 84.3 86.6
sc 50.1 68.1 74.9 82.9 88.9
col 49.5 64.4 68.8 73.4 83.7
>col 45.8 58.4 62.8 64.1 79.1
Total 44.8 66.5 73.2 74.6 82.5
Note: Each entry shows the labor force participation of married females, calcu-
lated from 2000 data from the Consumer Population Survey –see text for details.
The outer row shows the weighted average for a fixed male or female type.
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Table 6: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Comments
Discount Factor (β) 0.973 Calibrated - matches K/Y
Intertemporal Elasticity (Labor Supply) (γ) 0.4 Literature estimates.
Disutility of Market Work (B) 6 Calibrated - matches hours per worker
Capital Share (α) 0.317 Calibrated - see text.
Depreciation Rate (δk) 0.07 Calibrated - see text.
Probability of Retirement 1/40 Calibrated - implies average
working life of 40 years
Mortality rate (δ) 0.0982 Calibrated - implies fraction
of retired people in data.
Payroll Tax Rate (τp) 0.086 Calibrated - balances budget
Capital Income Tax Rate (τk) 0.124 Calibrated - Matches corporate tax
collections
Distribution of utility costs ζ(.|z) – Gamma Distribution - matches
LFP by education
conditional on husband’s type
Table 7: Model and Data
Statistic Data Model
Capital Output Ratio 2.325 2.321
Labor Hours Per-Worker 0.408 0.408
Participation rate of Married Females(%)
Less than High School 44.8 45.0
High School 66.5 66.1
Less than College 73.2 72.9
College 74.6 77.5
More than College 82.5 81.6
Total 68.9 69.2
Note: Entries summarizes the performance of the benchmark model in terms of
the stated targets.
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Table 8: Proportional Taxes (% change)
Consumption Income
Tax Tax
Labor Force Participation 7.3 6.2
Aggregate Hours 4.7 4.3
Aggregate Hours (Married Females) 10.6 9.3
Hours per worker (female) 2.6 2.3
Hours per worker (male) 2.8 2.6
Labor Input 4.2 3.8
Capital/Output 15.0 4.5
Aggregate Output 11.2 5.9
Wage 6.5 2.0
Tax rate (%) 17.8 12.7
NOTE: The results for a “consumption (income) tax” pertain to the replacement
of current income taxes by a proportional consumption (income) tax. The values
for ’Tax Rate’ correspond to the proportional rates that are necessary to achieve
budget balance.
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Table 9: Progressive Taxes (% change)
Progressive Consumption Tax Separate Filing
High Exemption Low Exemption
Labor Force Participation 3.2 6.3 5.9
Aggregate Hours 1.5 3.6 2.1
Aggregate Hours (Married Females) 4.4 8.7 7.3
Hours per worker (female) 0.3 1.5 0.8
Hours per worker (male) 0.9 2.1 0.2
Labor Input 1.5 3.2 1.6
Capital/Output 14.4 14.2 2.1
Aggregate Output 8.0 9.8 2.6
Wage 6.3 6.3 0.9
Tax Rate (%) 27.5 21.5 -1.5%
Note: Results in the first two columns pertain to the introduction of a progressive
consumption tax, which consists of an exemption level and a common tax rate
applied above this level. The ’high’ (’low’) exemption level corresponds to 1/3
(1/6) mean consumption for single individuals, and 1/2 (1/4) mean consumption
for married households in the benchmark economy. The last column shows the
effects of taxing individuals rather than households, as explained in the text. The
values for ’Tax Rate’ correspond to the proportional rates that are necessary to
achieve budget balance.
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Table 10: Contribution of Married Females to Changes in Labor Supply (%)
Propor. Propor. Progr. Progr. Separate
Cons. Inc. Cons. Cons. Filing
(high exemp.) (low exemp.)
Panel A: Total Changes
∆ in Married Female Hours
(% of Total ∆ in Hours) 59.3 58.1 80.1 64.9 91.4
∆ in Married Female Labor
(% of Total ∆ in Labor) 50.5 49.4 65.2 55.0 88.6
Panel B: Extensive Margin
∆ in Married Female Hours
(% of Total ∆ in Hours) 51.5 49.6 71.0 56.8 82.0
∆ in Married Female Labor
(% of Total ∆ in Labor) 42.7 40.7 55.4 46.7 77.0
Note: The entries show the contribution of changes in the labor supply of married
females relative to total changes in labor supply, both in terms of raw hours
changes as well as in terms of labor in efficiency units. The top panel shows the
contribution of total changes. The bottom panel shows only the contribution of
changes along the extensive margin.
Table 11: Changes in Labor Force Participation
Propor. Propor. Prog. Prog. Separate
Female Type Cons. Inc. Cons. Cons. Filing
(high exemp.) (low exemp.)
<hs 22.5 20.0 0.9 18.7 19.8
hs 9.1 6.3 6.1 7.6 6.9
sc 5.4 6.1 2.6 5.3 4.7
col 4.5 3.5 2.4 3.7 3.3
>col 2.7 1.7 1.0 2.2 1.7
Note: The entries show the percentage changes in labor force participation, ar-
ranged by the female type, for all reforms considered.
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Table 12: Reforms with Low Intertemporal Elasticity (% change)
Prop. Prop. Prog. Prog. Seperate
Cons. Inc. Cons. Cons. Filing
(high exemp.) (low exemp.)
Labor Force Participation 11.0 8.9 5.0 8.4 5.5
Aggregate Hours 4.6 3.9 1.7 3.4 1.8
Aggregate Hours (Married Fem.) 13.0 10.7 5.8 9.9 6.2
Hours per worker (female) 1.7 1.5 0.2 1.2 0.7
Hours per worker (male) 1.4 1.2 0.2 0.9 0.0
Labor Input 3.8 3.2 1.4 2.8 1.3
Aggregate output 10.3 5.4 8.0 9.4 2.7
∆ in Married Female Hours
(% of Total ∆ in Hours) 79.0 76.3 96.3 81.7 98.0
∆ in Married Female Labor
(% of Total ∆ in Labor) 71.2 68.4 86.2 73.6 96.0
Note: Results show the aggregate consequences of tax reforms under a low value
of the intertemporal elasticity parameter (γ = 0.2).
Table 13: Comparison with Standard Framework
High Elasticity (γ = 0.4) Low Elasticity (γ = 0.2)
Current Standard Current Standard
Framework Framework Framework Framework
Aggregate Hours 4.7 3.4 4.6 1.9
Labor Input 4.2 3.5 3.8 1.9
Aggregate Output 11.2 10.0 10.3 8.8
Hours per worker (male) 2.8 3.5 1.4 2.0
Note: The results show aggregate effects of a proportional consumption tax reform
under the framework developed in this paper, and under a version of a standard
macroeconomic model with a single earner as described in the text.
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Figure 1: Taxes and Labor Force Participation of Secondary Earners
44
FIG. 2: AVERAGE TAX RATES
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FIG. 3: MARGINAL TAX RATES
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